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Verification of Neural Networks:
Enhancing Scalability through Pruning
Dario Guidotti1 and Francesco Leofante2 and Luca Pulina3 and Armando Tacchella4
Abstract. Verification of deep neural networks has witnessed a re-
cent surge of interest, fueled by success stories in diverse domains
and by abreast concerns about safety and security in envisaged ap-
plications. Complexity and sheer size of such networks are chal-
lenging for automated formal verification techniques which, on the
other hand, could ease the adoption of deep networks in safety- and
security-critical contexts. In this paper we focus on enabling state-of-
the-art verification tools to deal with neural networks of some prac-
tical interest. We propose a new training pipeline based on network
pruning with the goal of striking a balance between maintaining ac-
curacy and robustness while making the resulting networks amenable
to formal analysis. The results of our experiments with a portfolio of
pruning algorithms and verification tools show that our approach is
successful for the kind of networks we consider and for some com-
binations of pruning and verification techniques, thus bringing deep
neural networks closer to the reach of formally-grounded methods.
1 Introduction
Verification of neural networks is currently a hot topic involving
different areas of AI across machine learning, constraint program-
ming, heuristic search and automated reasoning. A recent extensive
survey [5] cites more than 200 papers, most of which have been
published in the last few years, and more contributions are coming
out at an impressive rate — see, e.g., [1, 7, 25, 15, 14, 23] to cite
only some. Most of the current literature focuses on the verification
of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs): while their application in vari-
ous domains [8] have made them one of the most popular machine-
learned models to date, concerns about their vulnerability to adver-
sarial perturbations [21, 2] have been accompanying them since their
initial adoption, to the point of restraining their application in safety-
and security-related contexts.
In this paper we present evidence that state-of-the-art verification
tools can deal with DNNs of some practical interest through prepro-
cessing based on statistical techniques. We propose a new training
pipeline that leverages network pruning — a controlled reduction of
the size of neural networks to eliminate portions that are deemed
not crucial for their performances [18] — to produce easier-to-verify
networks. Our goal is to strike a balance between maintaining ac-
curacy, generalization power and robustness of our networks, while
making them amenable to formal analysis. In particular, we consider
two mainstream pruning techniques, namely neuron pruning [18]
and weight pruning [10]. Intuitively, the former technique attempts
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to make DNNs leaner by removing neurons, and thus severing all
connections across different layers going through pruned neurons;
the latter acts on connections, removing neurons only when all con-
nections through a neuron are zeroed out. Both techniques make the
network graph sparser, so the key idea behind our approach is that,
as long as sparse networks retain acceptable performances, their ver-
ification might be easier than that of their dense counterparts [27],
enabling deployment in contexts where formal guarantees are of the
essence, and smaller networks are a welcome bonus.
To put our idea to the test, we consider fully-connected DNNs
trained on well-known datasets — namely MNIST [9] and Fash-
ion MNIST [26] — and a portfolio of verification tools to assess
the gain brought by pruning to the verification phase. Among the
plethora of verification methods available [5], we focus on the kind
surveyed in [11] characterized by a “push button” approach in which,
given input pre-conditions and output post-conditions stated as con-
straints in some formal logic, a tool is asked to answer an entail-
ment query in such logic, i.e., whether the post-conditions are satis-
fied given that pre-conditions hold. We further focus on tools that are
distributed as system prototypes, and assemble our portfolio consid-
ering diverse approaches within the class we focus on. In particular,
we consider Marabou [7], ERAN [19] and MIPVerify [22]. Marabou
transforms the entailment query into constraint satisfaction problems
solved with a dedicated satisfiabilty modulo theory (SMT) solver.
ERAN tackles the certification of neural networks against adversarial
perturbations by combining over-approximation methods with pre-
cise mixed integer linear programming (MILP). Finally, MIPVerify
is a robustness analyzer completely based on a compilation to MILP.
Through the combination of weight and neuron pruning and our
selection of verification tools we can observe the following results:
• Without network pruning, the verification of relatively small fully
connected networks — about 50K connections on 896 neurons —
is mostly out of the reach of complete verification tools within a
timeout of 10 CPU minutes.
• Neuron pruning is a stronger enabler than weight pruning; all tools
benefit from it, and for some combinations of parameters and ver-
ification tools, neuron pruning enables the verification of all the
network instances that we consider within the timeout.
• Weight pruning appears to be only effective for small networks
and high magnitude of pruning (e.g., 90% of the total weights).
In particular ERAN, both in its complete and incomplete version
seems to be able to reap more benefits of weight pruning than
MIPVerify and Marabou.
While our findings are related to fully-connected networks trained
and tested on specific datasets, we believe that similar advantages
can be obtained considering more complex feed-forward architec-
tures including, e.g., convolutional or residual layers, and other stan-
dard datasets which will be the subject of our continuing research.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we in-
troduce some basic notation and definitions to be used throughout
the paper. In Section 3 we introduce our approach, detailing the algo-
rithms for different kinds of pruning and other modifications required
to make networks amenable to formal analysis. In Section 4 we de-
scribe the datasets on which our experimental analysis is based, and
the specific conditions that we asked the verification tools to check.
In Section 5 we present the setup and the results of our experimental
analysis. We conclude the paper in Section 6 with some final remarks
and our agenda for future research.
2 Background
A neural network is a system of interconnected computing units
called neurons. In fully connected feed-forward networks, neurons
are arranged in disjoint layers, with each layer being fully connected
only with the next one, and without connection between neurons in
the same layer. Given a feed-forward neural network N with n lay-
ers, we denote the i-th layer ofN as h(i). We call a layer without in-
coming connections input layer h(1), a layer without outgoing con-
nections output layer h(n), while all other layers are referred to as
hidden layers . Each hidden layer performs specific transformations
on the inputs it receives. In this work we consider hidden layers that
make use of linear and batch normalization modules. Given an input
vector x, a linear module computes a linear combination of its values
as follows:
L
(i) = W(i) · x+ b(i) (1)
where W(i) is the matrix of weights and b(i) is the vector of the bi-
ases associated with the linear module in the i-th layer and L(i) is the
corresponding output. Entries of both W(i) and b(i) are learned pa-
rameters. In our target architectures, each linear module is followed
by a batch normalization module. This is done to address the so-
called internal covariate shift problem, i.e., the change of the dis-
tribution of each layer’s input during training [6]. The mathematical
formulation of batch normalization layers can be expressed as
BN
(i) =
γ(i)
2
√
σ(i) + ǫ(i)
⊙ (L(i) − µ(i)) + β(i) (2)
All the operators in this equation are element-wise operators: in
particular ⊙ and the fractional symbol represent respectively the
Hadamard product and division. BN(i) and L(i) are the output and
the input vectors of the module, respectively. γ(i), µ(i), σ(i), β(i)
are vectors, whereas ǫ(i) is a scalar value. These are learned parame-
ters of the batch normalization layer. In particular µ(i) and σ(i) are
the estimated mean and variance of the inputs computed during train-
ing.
Finally, the output of hidden layer i is computed as h(i) =
Φ(i)(BN(i)), where Φ(i) is the activation function associated to
the neurons in the layer. We consider only networks utilizing
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation functions, i.e., Φ(i) =
max(0,BN(i)). Given an input vector x, the network N computes
an output vector y by means of the following computations
h
(1) = x
h
(i) = Φ(i)(BN(i)(L(i)(h(i−1)))) i = 2, . . . , n− 1
y = h(n) = L(h(n−1))
(3)
A neural network can be considered as a non-linear function
fw : X → Y , where X is the input space of the network, Y is the
output space and w is the vector representing the weights of all the
connections. We consider neural network applied to classification of
d-dimensional vectors of real numbers, i.e., X ⊆ Rd and Y ⊆ Rm,
where d is the dimension of the input vector andm is the dimension
of the output vector and thus also the number of possible classes of
interest. We assume that given an input sample x the output vector
fw(x) contains the likelihood that x belongs to one of them classes.
The specific class can be computed as
argmax
i∈{1,...,m}
(fw(x))c
where (fw(x))c denotes the c-th element of fw. Training of (deep)
neural networks poses substantial computational challenges since for
state-of-the-art models the size of w can be in the order of millions.
As in any machine learning task, training must select weights so as
to maximize the likelihood that the networks responds correctly, i.e.,
if the input x is of class k, the chance of misclassification should
be as small as possible, where misclassification occurs whenever the
following holds
argmax
c∈{1,...,m}
(fw(x))c 6= k
Training can be achieved through minimization of some kind of loss
function whose value is low when the chance of misclassification is
also low. While there are many different kinds of loss functions, in
general they are structured in the following way:
J(w) =
1
n
n∑
k=0
Err(yk, argmax
i∈{1,...,m}
(fw(xk))i) + λ · Reg(w) (4)
where n is the number of training pairs (xk, yk), yk is the correct
class label of xk,Err represents the loss caused by misclassification,
Reg is a regularization function, and λ is the parameter controlling
the effect ofReg on J . The regularization function is needed to avoid
overfitting, i.e., high variance of the training results with respect to
the training data. The regularization function usually penalizes mod-
els with high complexity by smoothing out sharp variations induced
in the trained network by the Err function. A common regulariza-
tion function is, for example, the L2 norm:
Reg(w) =
1
2n
||w||2 (5)
3 Pruning for verification: training pipeline
In this Section we present the core algorithms of our approach based
on network pruning (NP) and weight pruning (WP). Concerning NP,
its aim is to remove neurons from the network, together with the cor-
responding input and output connections. Algorithm 1 reports our
approach based on NP techniques that we adapted from those pro-
posed in [12] for convolutional neural networks. Looking at the pseu-
docode in Algorithm 1, we can see that the procedure takes as input
(Line 1) the NN to train (fw), the sparsity rate (ρ) — which indi-
cates the percentage of neurons to prune — and a regularizer (λ);
the pruned network is returned as output (Line 8). The first step of
the algorithm consists in training the network (Line 2) using a loss
function with regularization element (λ) which encourages to nullify
the parameters γ(i) of the batch normalization layers. The regular-
ization term we consider in SPARSETRAINING can be formalized as
λ·∑n
i=2 ||γ(i)||1, referring to the network topology presented in Sec-
tion 2. Each of these parameters identifies a neuron of the previous
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Algorithm 1 Neuron Pruning
1: function NEURONPRUNING(fw, ρ, λ)
2: fw˜ ← SPARSETRAINING(fw, λ)
3: weights← EXTRACTWEIGHTSBATCHNORM(fw˜)
4: incWeights← INCORDER(weights)
5: threshold← incWeights[ρ· LEN(weights)]
6: fˆw˜ ← PRUNENEURONS(fw˜, threshold)
7: fˆŵ ← FINETUNE(fˆw˜)
8: return fˆŵ
9: end function
Algorithm 2Weight Pruning
1: function WEIGHTPRUNING(fw, ρ)
2: fw˜ ← TRAINING(fw)
3: weights← EXTRACTWEIGHTSLINEAR(fw˜)
4: incWeights← INCORDER(weights)
5: threshold← incWeights[ρ· LEN(weights)]
6: fw˜ ← PRUNEWEIGHTS(fw, threshold)
7: fŵ ← FINETUNE(fw˜)
8: return fŵ
9: end function
linear layer. In Line 3 and 4, we extract the weight parameters (i.e.,
γi) of the batch normalization layers and we sort them in ascending
order. In Line 5, we select as threshold the weight with index equals
to the number of neurons we want to prune (given by the Sparsity
Rate ρmultiplied for the number of weights): in this way the number
of weights below the threshold corresponds exactly to the number of
neuron we want to prune. PRUNENEURONS (Line 6) applies neuron
pruning by eliminating all the neurons corresponding to the weights
of the batch normalization layers which are below the threshold com-
puted in Line 5. Finally, the pruned network is trained again in order
to remedy to the loss of accuracy caused by pruning (FINETUNE,
Line 7).
Considering WP, the general aim of this technique is to eliminate
weights, i.e., set them to 0. Also in this case, weights are pruned if
their values after training are below a user-specified threshold. Al-
gorithm 2 shows the pseudocode of our approach inspired by [4]. In
Line 2 we train a NN using a standard training procedure. In lines 3
and 4, the weights of the linear layers are extracted from the origi-
nal network fw˜ and then are sorted in ascending order. In Line 5 we
select the threshold from ordered weights based on the Sparsity Rate
parameter ρ, in the same way as we do in the NP algorithm. Then,
PRUNEWEIGHTS (Line 6) sets to 0 all the weights of the network
of interest which are smaller than the threshold, hence obtaining the
pruned network fŵ. Analogously to what we do for NP, at the end of
the procedure (Line 7) we fine tune the pruned network.
Encoding batch normalization layers as linear layers Not all
the verification tools accept networks with batch normalization lay-
ers. For this reason, our final models need to be devoid of such mod-
ules, but training and neuron pruning require those layers to func-
tion properly. To overcome this hurdle, we propose a post-processing
technique to merge together a batch normalization layer and the pre-
vious linear layer in a new linear layer. Merging is performed after
training and pruning. To see how merging is performed, let us con-
sider again the expressions for a generic linear layer and its subse-
quent batch normalization layer:
L
(i) = W(i) · h(i−1) + b(i)
BN
(i) =
γ(i)
2
√
σ(i) + ǫ(i)
⊙ (L(i) − µ(i)) + β(i)
(6)
By substituting the value of L(i) in the second equation with the
value given by the first one we obtain:
BN
(i) = I · γ
(i)
2
√
σ(i) + ǫ(i)
·W(i) · h(i−1)+
+
γ(i)
2
√
σ(i) + ǫ(i)
⊙ (b(i) − µ(i)) + β(i)
(7)
where I represent the identity matrix with dimension d × d, and all
the other symbols have the same meaning of the corresponding ones
in equations 1 and 2. Therefore we can express the operations per-
formed by the two layers by means of a new linear layer defined with
the following parameters
W
(i) := I · γ
(i)
2
√
σ(i) + ǫ(i)
·W(i)
b
(i) :=
γ(i)
2
√
σ(i) + ǫ(i)
⊙ (b(i) − µ(i)) + β(i)
(8)
4 Case studies
In our experimental analysis we consider networks trained on
MNIST [9] and Fashion MNIST (FMNIST) [26] datasets. Both
datasets consist of 70000 grayscale images of 28× 28 pixels divided
up in 10 different classes, each class represented by the same number
of images. The datasets are both divided in a training set of 60000 im-
ages and a test set of 10000 images. The difference between the two
datasets is that MNIST images represent handwritten digits, whereas
FMNIST images represent fashion articles. While the two datasets
are similar, it turns out that training neural classifiers for FMNIST is
harder than solving the same task for MNIST, as testified in [26].
To perform verification of the trained networks, we consider the
absence of L∞-bounded adversarial examples as our main require-
ment. We recall that the infinity norm, denoted as L∞, is defined for
any vector x = (x1, . . . , xd) as
||x||∞ = max(|x1|, . . . , |xd|).
Besides simplicity and generality — the existence of L∞-bounded
adversarial examples can be easily stated in all the verification tools
we consider — the absence or timely detection of such adversar-
ial examples is relevant for practical applications [21]. We can for-
malize absence of L∞-bounded adversarial examples for networks
performing image classification tasks in the following way. Let be
fw : X → Y be a neural network for image classification as defined
in Section 2. Given an input image xˆ ∈ X and a bound ε on the
infinity norm, we can express a targeted L∞-bounded adversarial
example of class k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} as an image x such that
||x− xˆ||∞ < ε ⇒ argmax
c∈{1,...,m}
(fw(x))c = k (9)
where “⇒” denotes logical implication and k is the class assigned
by the network to the adversarial x. The corresponding untargeted
L∞ − bounded adversarial example is an image x such that
||x− xˆ||∞ < ε ⇒ argmax
c∈{1,...,m}
(fw(x))c 6= j (10)
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where j is the correct label for the image xˆ. In the following we
speak of targeted and untargeted adversarial examples meaning the
L∞-bounded versions defined above, and we describe in detail how
we encoded the search for adversarial examples in the tools that we
consider.
The encoding of targeted adversarial examples for Marabou is
straightforward. Considering a network fw : X → Y with X ⊆ Rd
and Y ⊆ Rm, given an input image xˆ ∈ X , the target adversarial
class k and the bound on the infinity norm ǫ we can encode (9) as:
xˆi − ε ≤ xi ≤ xˆi + ε for 0 ≤ i ≤ d
yk ≥ yj for 0 ≤ j ≤ m, j 6= k (11)
where xˆi denotes the i-th component of vector xˆ, xi with i ∈
{1, . . . , d} and yj with j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} are d+m search variables,
tagged as input and output variables, respectively: Marabou connects
input and output variables through the encoding of fw performed
automatically — we refer to [7] for more details. The encoding of
the untargeted adversarial search is currently beyond our capability
because Marabou does not offer an easy way to encode disjunction
of constraints like
∨
k
(yk ≥ yj) that would be required to express
condition (10). For this reason, we consider only targeted adversarial
search in the experiments with Marabou.
ERAN provides untargeted adversarial example search only. The
encoding of the property and the network is performed automatically
by the tool, given the network fw and an image xˆ. In particular,
ERAN uses an abstract interpretation approach in order to compute
a symbolic overapproximation Y of the concrete outputs of the neu-
ral network fw, given a symbolic overapproximation X of the set of
possible inputs. The overapproximation is such that fw(x) ∈ Y as
long as x ∈ X , i.e., all concrete outputs are accounted for, as long
as the concrete input is contained within the boundaries of the input
overapproximation. In the case of L∞ bounded adversarial search
we have that X contains all the vectors x such that ||x − x||∞ ≤ ε:
the corresponding output approximation Y may contain values for
which the likelihood of the correct label is smaller than some other
label. ERAN features two versions: an incomplete one, where the
output approximation is inspected to check whether the network is
safe with respect to adversarial; a complete version, where ERAN
takes one more step and calls a MILP solver in order to find and out-
put a concrete adversarial example. More details about ERAN can be
found in [19].
MIPVerify can search for both targeted and untargeted adversarial
examples and it also automatically generates its internal encoding
given the network of interest and a starting input image. In particular
MIPVerify encodes the search of the untargeted adversarial example
as the following MILP problem:
minx ε
argmax
c∈{1,...,m}
(fw(x))c 6= j
xi ≤ xˆi + ε for 0 ≤ i ≤ d
xi ≥ xˆi − ε for 0 ≤ i ≤ d
(12)
As can be seen from (12), MIPVerify searches for the adversarial ex-
ample which is closer to the original image. The encoding of the net-
work fw is based on the formulation of piece-wise linear functions
as conjunctions of MILP constraints. For an in-depth explanation of
the complete encoding we refer to [22].
5 Experiments
5.1 Setup
We consider two different baseline architectures: both of them con-
sists of an input layer with 784 neurons and an output layer with 10
neurons. They both present three fully connected hidden layers with
64, 32, 16 neurons and 128, 64, 32 neurons respectively. We will
identify them as NET1 and NET2 respectively. Each hidden layer is
followed by a batch normalization layer and activation functions are
Rectified Linear Units (ReLUs). Networks are trained using an SGD
optimizer with Nesterov momentum [20]. The learning parameters
are:
• learning rate = 0.1, defining how quickly the model replaces the
concepts it has learned with new ones, i.e., controlling how much
the optimizer can modify the network weights at each iteration;
• momentum = 0.9, explained in [20], to control the gradient evo-
lution in the attempt to escape local minima;
• weight decay = 10−4, i.e., the magnitude of the regularization;
• batch size = 64, defining the number of samples considered be-
fore updating the model.
We also use a learning rate scheduler which multiplies the learning
rate with a factor of 0.1 whenever the loss stops decreasing for
more than 3 consecutive epochs. The learning proceeds for 100
epochs unless the loss stops decreasing for more than 10 consecutive
epochs, in which case it terminates. All the learning and pruning
algorithm we present are implemented using the learning framework
PyTorch [16] with GPU-intensive computation running on top of
Google Colaboratory service.
Param Neuron SR Weight SR Regularizer
SET1 ρnp = 0.75/0.8 ρwp = 0.9 λ = 10−1
SET2 ρnp = 0.5 ρwp = 0.7 λ = 10−4
SET3 ρnp = 0.25 ρwp = 0.5 λ = 0.5 · 10−4
Table 1. Sets of parameters considered in our experiment. Param repre-
sents the identifiers of the different parameter sets. Neuron SR and Weight
SR represent the sparsity rate (SR) for neuron pruning and weight pruning,
respectively. Regularizer represent the regularizer value for sparse training
in neuron pruning. Neuron SR for SET3 is 0.75 for NET1 and 0.8 for NET2.
Table 1 shows the three different sets of pruning parameters con-
sidered in our experiments. Neuron SR and Weight SR are the spar-
sity rates supplied to the neuron pruning and weight pruning proce-
dures. We test three different sets of parameter to analyze how the
performances of the verification tools change with respect to differ-
ent amounts of pruning, with SET1 being the most aggressive be-
tween the three. Our implementation of weight pruning is based on
the code described in [13], and our implementation of neuron prun-
ing is based on the code described in [12]. The setup presented is
used for the networks trained on MNIST as well as FMNIST.
For each baseline network and dataset we test the following:
• Baseline Network: this is the network trained using the standard
training method without the regularizer λ.
• Sparse Network: this is the network trained using the sparse train-
ing method with the regularizer λ.
• NP Network: this is the network trained with Algorithm 1 pre-
sented in Section 3.
• WP Network: this is the network trained with Algorithm 2 pre-
sented in Section 3.
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For each such network we compute the accuracy with respect to the
original test set and the robustness using the tool Foolbox [17]. In
particular we consider the L∞ bounded adversarial attack Gradient
Sign Method (GSM) [2] in order to compute adversarial examples.
We use this method to assemble twenty images for which an adver-
sarial example can be found or can not be found by Foolbox on all
the variant of the network of interest (i.e., the adversarial is found on
the same image for Baseline, Sparse, NP and WP networks or it is
not found for none of them.) — notice that this does not mean that an
adversarial does not exist, because GSM is sound but not complete
with respect to the set of all bounded adversarial examples of a given
network. The images resulting from this process are the ones fed to
verification tools in order to test their performances. For all our ex-
periments, we consider ε = 0.1 as the bound on the infinity norm.
The tools are tested with a timeout of 600 seconds for each adversar-
ial example, running ERAN in its complete verification version.
One last remark about the setup concerns how we run the tools on
different problems. In particular, for Marabou we test the images for
which an adversarial example was found by searching for an adver-
sarial example of the same class found by Foolbox, whereas we test
only one image for which the adversarial was not found, but consid-
ering all the possible classes, one by one, for the adversarial example.
Because of this, we consider 19 instances of the adversarial search,
as opposed to the 20 instances considered for the other tools. For
ERAN and MIPVerify we consider untargeted adversarial example
search only.
5.2 Results
MNIST
Base Param Network Accuracy Robustness
NET1
Baseline 0.982 0.322
SET1
Sparse 0.961 0.200
WP 0.982 0.346
NP 0.951 0.170
SET2
Sparse 0.984 0.353
WP 0.983 0.346
NP 0.975 0.204
SET3
Sparse 0.982 0.276
WP 0.984 0.357
NP 0.982 0.264
NET2
Baseline 0.985 0.360
SET1
Sparse 0.963 0.151
WP 0.985 0.405
NP 0.963 0.151
SET2
Sparse 0.987 0.353
WP 0.987 0.405
NP 0.984 0.309
SET3
Sparse 0.987 0.363
WP 0.987 0.418
NP 0.986 0.367
Table 2. Accuracy and Robustness of the networks of interest for the dataset
MNIST. See Table 1 for the meaning of Param. The column Network rep-
resent the different networks we have considered in our experiments. The
column Accuracy represent the accuracy of the networks computed on the
test set. Robustness represent the robustness of the networks computed using
Foolbox. Base represent which baseline architecture was used.
Accuracy and robustness Tables 2 and 3 show the results of
our analysis about the accuracy and the robustness of the networks
trained on MNIST and FMNIST, respectively. The purpose of these
data is to show that our training pipeline does robustness and accu-
racy of our networks do not differ from baseline architectures in a
FMNIST
Base Param Network Accuracy Robustness
NET1
Baseline 0.894 0.051
SET1
Sparse 0.855 0.030
WP 0.887 0.023
NP 0.854 0.030
SET2
Sparse 0.894 0.052
WP 0.895 0.035
NP 0.885 0.052
SET3
Sparse 0.894 0.038
WP 0.894 0.047
NP 0.893 0.052
NET2
Baseline 0.895 0.039
SET1
Sparse 0.856 0.045
WP 0.895 0.025
NP 0.871 0.041
SET2
Sparse 0.899 0.046
WP 0.896 0.031
NP 0.895 0.045
SET3
Sparse 0.901 0.054
WP 0.899 0.039
NP 0.899 0.074
Table 3. Accuracy and Robustness of the networks of interest for the dataset
FMNIST. See Table 2 for the meaning of the columns.
Base Param Network # HL Neurons # Weights
NET1
Baseline 112 52896
SET1
Sparse 112 52896
WP 112 5290
NP 27 9624
SET2
Sparse 112 52896
WP 112 15869
NP 55 27804
SET3
Sparse 112 52896
WP 112 26448
NP 83 40482
NET2
Baseline 224 110912
SET1
Sparse 224 110912
WP 224 11091
NP 44 19256
SET2
Sparse 224 110912
WP 224 33274
NP 111 48514
SET3
Sparse 224 110912
WP 224 55456
NP 167 75662
Table 4. Number of hidden neurons and of weights of the networks of in-
terest. These values are valid for both the MNIST and FMNIST datasets. For
the meaning of columns Baseline, Param and Network see Table 2. # HL
Neurons represent the number of neurons of the hidden layers of the network,
# Weights represent the number of connection in the network.
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substantial way, which makes the approach of running verification
to certify pruned networks useful in practice. Should our networks
result in unsatisfactory accuracy or robustness rates, it would not be
interesting to subject them to further analysis. As it can be observed,
both the weight-pruned networks and the neuron-pruned ones present
a slight decrease in accuracy which correlates positively with the
strength of pruning, i.e., the larger the sparsity rate, the higher the
loss in accuracy. The results related to robustness are less clear cut:
on MNIST, robustness decreases in neuron pruned networks, but it
increases in weight pruned ones; on FMNIST dataset the opposite
appears to be true. Given this discrepancy, we believe that further in-
vestigation on pruning techniques — which is beyond the scope of
this paper — might be in order. Here, we just mention that decrease
in robustness has been linked to over-pruning in [3], where networks
are considered to be over-pruned whenever they are more than 50
times smaller than their baseline; still in [3], more modest levels of
pruning are linked with an increase in robustness. To quantify the
impact of our procedures on the resulting architectures, we report the
number of neurons and weights surviving in the hidden layers of the
pruned networks in Table 4. As it can be observed, networks pruned
with NP present a great number of pruned connections besides the
expected pruned neurons, but this still does not explain the discrep-
ancy observed in robustness. Another explanation could be that the
fine-tuning performed in our pruning procedures is not oriented to
achieve robustness — which could be done using techniques such as
robust training [24]. In this case, the robustness of the resulting net-
work could be improved by using the proper training procedures and
the overall results could be made more predictable than our current
setting.
Impact on verification Table 5 reports the results of our experi-
ments with the verification tools we consider. In particular we rep-
resent the number of problems, i.e., adversarial searches, that each
tool managed to complete successfully with respect to the different
datasets, sets of parameters and sets of images. It should be noted that
the number of solvable problems is always 20, except for Marabou,
where the number of problems is 19. As it can be observed, the gen-
eral trend for all the tools is that neuron-pruned networks are verified
more easily than other configurations, in particular when the pruning
is made more aggressive. However, there are some exceptions to this
trend. For instance, we could observe that when NET2 networks are
strongly pruned (i.e., NET2 and SET1), MIPVerify is able to solve
more instances on the sparse networks than on the neuron pruned
ones.
Weight pruning appears to be consistently less effective than neu-
ron pruning and, in the case of strongly pruned NET2 networks, even
than the sparse training. It should be noted that for the SET1 level of
pruning Marabou and MIPVerify present unexpected behaviours: in
some cases Marabou terminates immediately reporting that the veri-
fication query was not satisfiable, whereas MIPVerify returns an ar-
ray of Not a Number. The experiments in which the tools were sub-
ject to the above mentioned problem are identified with a ∗ beside
the number of instances verified (the instances in which the problem
arised were considered as timed out). We believe these behaviours
might be the result of numerical instabilities caused by matrix spar-
sity. In the case of MIPVerify, this hypothesis has been confirmed by
its developers. Gurobi, the underlying solver used by MIPVerify, is
affected by the bad conditioning of the sparse matrices our proce-
dures produce.
In Table 5 we do not report runtimes on the solved instances, but
if we consider them then we see that Marabou and MIPVerify have
comparable performances: Marabou is better than MIpVerify on FM-
NIST but it is worse on MNIST. On the other hand, ERAN seems to
be consistently faster than Marabou and MIPVerify. As we expected,
all the tools appear to be, on average, faster on networks which are
pruned more aggressively.
Effects of WP and NP on complete methods We now turn our
attention to the different effects NP and WP had on the perfor-
mances of verification tools. We postulate that the observed differ-
ences can be explained by considering the techniques at the core of
the verification algorithms considered. Indeed, all three tools resort
to constraint-based methodologies (SMT and MILP) whose perfor-
mances are sensitive to the number of variables and constraints to
be found in the encoding of the original problem. The compilation
of the non-linear activation functions requires a (potentially large)
number of variables and constraints to represent them, and thus re-
ducing neurons has a direct impact on the sheer complexity of the
encoding. On the other hand, weight pruning eliminates mostly arith-
metical operations but leaves the number of variables and constraints
mostly unchanged. To support these hypothesis we have performed
some additional experimental analysis on the version of ERAN re-
lying on abstract interpretation only — the results are presented in
Table 6. In this “incomplete” version, ERAN does not make use of a
MILP solver in order to find the adversarial example, but it just analy-
ses the robustness of the network through sound overapproximations.
ERAN-incomplete is able to manage networks more efficiently than
Marabou and MIPVerifiy, but abstract adversarial examples may no
longer succeed to map to concrete ones. As it can be seen in Ta-
ble 6, ERAN-incomplete manages to verify weight-pruned networks
in less time than neuron-pruned ones, and the speed-up appears to be
directly related to the number of weights pruned.
Regarding the results obtained for the sparse networks when heav-
ily pruned, we believe that MIPVerify and ERAN manage to lever-
age the presence of many connection weights set to zero in order to
remove non-linearity from their MILP problems. In particular when-
ever a non-linear activation function presents only zero values con-
nections in input or in output it is removed, since it would not in-
fluence the network in any way. To confirm our hypothesis we have
analysed the log files of Gurobi when called by MIPVerify on the
weight pruned, neuron pruned and sparse networks: as we expected
the problem solved by Gurobi in the case of neuron pruned and sparse
networks present less than 1/4 of integer variables with respect to the
problem solved on the weight pruned networks.
6 Conclusions and Future Works
One of the main challenges with verification of (deep) neural net-
works is the scalability of the currently available tools. While a great
deal of research effort has been put in developing new and more scal-
able verification tools, leveraging statistical methods from the ma-
chine learning community to ease formal analysis has been mostly
ignored. In this paper we have provided evidence that the interac-
tion between pruning methods and verification tools can be effective
and enable formal analysis of networks that could not be checked
otherwise. We have studied how two different pruning methods can
be embedded in a training pipeline to produce networks with good
accuracy and robustness, while lowering the complexity of their cor-
responding verification problem. As future research, we plan to ex-
tend the work presented to convolutional neural networks, consider-
ing also other pruning methods, e.g., filter pruning, and verification
tools. Moreover we intend to investigate the robustness property of
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MNIST
Base Param Network Marabou MIPVerify ERAN
NET1
Baseline 0 0 0
SET1
Sparse 0∗ 15∗ 20
WP 8 5∗ 14
NP 18 16∗ 20
SET2
Sparse 0 0 1
WP 0 0 7
NP 5 15 17
SET3
Sparse 0 0 1
WP 0 0 1
NP 6 0 7
NET2
Baseline 0 0 0
SET1
Sparse 0∗ 17∗ 20
WP 9 0 0
NP 18 14∗ 19
SET2
Sparse 0∗ 0 0
WP 0 0 0
NP 0 0 1
SET3
Sparse 0 0 0
WP 0 0 0
NP 1 0 0
FMNIST
Base Param Network Marabou MIPVerify ERAN
NET1
Baseline 0 0 1
SET1
Sparse 0∗ 20 20
WP 2 5 19
NP 19 20 20
SET2
Sparse 0 0 0
WP 0 0 5
NP 6 4 20
SET3
Sparse 0 0 0
WP 3 0 3
NP 0 0 4
NET2
Baseline 0 0 1
SET1
Sparse 0∗ 19∗ 20
WP 0 0 0
NP 0∗ 17 20
SET2
Sparse 0∗ 0 0
WP 0 0 0
NP 0 0 0
SET3
Sparse 0∗ 0 0
WP 0 0 0
NP 0 0 0
Table 5. Results of our experiment for Marabou, ERAN and MIPVerify. The values reported represent the number of problems which were solved successfully
within the timeout. See Table 3 for the meaning of the columns Param, Network and Base.Marabou,MIPVerify and ERAN represent the number of problems
solved by Marabou, MIPVerify and ERAN, respectively.
ERAN - incomplete
Base Param Network MNIST FMNIST
NET1
Baseline 2.12s 2.15s
SET1
Sparse 1.38s 1.37s
WP 0.23s 0.27s
NP 0.40s 0.25s
SET2
Sparse 2.15s 2.17s
WP 0.68s 0.77s
NP 1.02s 0.94s
SET3
Sparse 2.16s 2.18s
WP 1.10s 1.15s
NP 1.56s 1.58s
NET2
Baseline 6.52 6.60
SET1
Sparse 5.48s 5.45s
WP 0.88s 1.18s
NP 1.01s 0.74s
SET2
Sparse 6.24s 6.25s
WP 2.15s 2.37s
NP 2.33s 2.24s
SET3
Sparse 5.96s 5.86s
WP 3.19s 3.38s
NP 3.89s 1.28s
Table 6. Results of our experiment for the datasets MNIST and FMNIST on
the incomplete version of ERAN. See Table 3 for the meaning of the columns
Param and Network. The columns MNIST and FMNIST report the average
times needed to solve a single adversarial search for MNIST and FMNIST
datasets, respectively. The averages are computed on 30 different images.
the pruned networks, both using different pruning methods and test-
ing them using robust training and other analogous techniques.
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